An Impossible Position: British Diplomacy with Japan and the United States, 1914-1921

Katie Cordell
Apr 30
5 min read

It is therefore thought that the importance of not antagonising America must be the dominating factor in considering the question of the renewal of the Japanese Alliance. Hence, if some form of understanding with Japan is to be continued, it must be done in such a way as to not embarrass in the smallest degree our relations with America.[emphasis added] - British War Office to Foreign Office, February 14, 1920

In 1902, Britain and Japan entered into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, committing to mutual military support in case of war and recognizing one another’s interests in East Asia. Though the two powers had spent the preceding 50 years wary of one another, Russia’s emergence as a mutual opponent drew them together. For the British, Russia was an ever-present enemy to their ambitions in China, but more importantly to their crown jewel, India. The Japanese feared a Russian invasion of their protectorate Korea, which a German observer called “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.” By 1921, a shifting world order meant that the British had real and serious questions about the usefulness of the alliance. Was Russia, now embroiled in a civil war, still a viable menace? Was Japan, now encroaching steadily into China and having annexed Korea, a potential foe? Or, perhaps more pressing, were American ambitions in the Pacific enough of a threat to Japan that the two would clash sooner rather than later? All of these questions weighed on the British diplomats charged with assessing the possibility of continuing the alliance.

A political poster depicts two men shaking hands. On the left, John Bull dressed in white pants, a yellow vest, and a black suit jacket with top hat stands in front of the Union flag. On the right, a Japanese solider wearing cold weather uniform and service hat, holding his firearm next to him, stands in front of the Japanese flag. The two men shake hands. The top of the poster reads “Vote for the Conservatives” and the bottom reads “Who Gave You the Alliance.” — A political poster showing John Bull shaking hands with a Japanese solider, against the Union flag and the Japanese flag by artist E. Huskinson. Image via London School of Economics flickr.

My thesis, “The Falling Empire and the Rising Sun: The End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1914-1921,” explores the question the British asked themselves in the waning years of the alliance: Was the alliance worth continuing, even at risk of raising the ire of the United States? My thesis explores this question, which seems simplistic in its construction; the answer, as I learned during my research, is far more complex than historians have previously uncovered. Two books have previously addressed the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at length, but both were published prior to the eventual declassification of important documents from 1914 to 1921 that reveal a vulnerable and anxious British government trying to maintain its status as the dominant world leader while also dealing with two rapidly rising powers determined to cement their own status. Rather than a simple calculus, the British found themselves caught between the two newest major powers on the world stage, their own empire still geographically large but weakened, and reeling from the losses of the First World War. While they resisted the reality that the war had fundamentally changed the world order, British leaders were acutely aware of the fact that both Japan and the United States aspired to grow their empires. Unfortunately, their ambitions seemed to focus on the same area: the Pacific. The two new powers appeared to be on a collision course and the British were squarely in the middle.

Diplomatic documents make it clear that the British were driven primarily by a fear of the United States, not out of a loss of favor towards Japan. American public opinion was deeply suspicious of the British and the American government leaned on British leaders, demanding repayment of the substantial loans they had given during the war. Moreover, the Admiralty assessed that the United States posed a real military threat, especially as both the British economy and military were too weak to sustain any further fighting. Even as late as June 1921, British leaders believed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still a valuable policy. They did not arrive at their analysis sentimentally, but instead through careful thought about their own vulnerable position in the Far East. A majority of those who crafted policy memoranda believed that, although the Japanese were growing more assertive, the alliance served as a check on those ambitions. Whether the British had the ability to realistically hold Japan back is not the question at hand; they did genuinely believe in 1921 that the alliance was an effective restraint on Japanese expansion.

The British also felt that the United States was not necessarily the better choice as an ally. British leaders called the Americans unreliable, difficult, temperamental, and arrogant at varying points in the years preceding 1921. Indeed, the Americans heavily pressured the British on a multitude of points during and after the First World War. Dismissing this pressure risks oversimplifying Anglo-American relations. In his memoir Twenty-Five Years, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister from 1905 to 1916, explained that even as early as 1914, the British “dared not risk offending the United States.” Grey’s words remained the governing policy for the Foreign Office regarding Japan until the British made the difficult decision to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. Leaders across numerous departments within the British government grappled with the decision in the years leading to the alliance’s demise. In each instance, the consensus decision was that, although Japan may become a threat in the future, the United States was the more pressing and direct problem. As a result of American posturing and remarks that “renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be ‘disastrous,’” the British were left with the sole option of attempting to form a tripartite alliance. While they did successfully conclude a treaty between themselves, Japan, the US, and France, the agreement was fragile at best, and Japanese leaders felt increasingly isolated due to US encroachments in the Pacific.

In looking at the years 1902 to 1921, it is clear that neither Japan nor the United States were content with consideration as second-tier powers. Japanese leaders campaigned for better treaty agreements, more territory, and equal racial status with the West. In contrast, the Americans pushed to exclude Japan, as they viewed the Japanese as a primary obstacle to US control of the Pacific. Even after Wilson approved terms of the Treaty of Versailles that granted Japan territory and rights in the Pacific, the American government refused to acknowledge those terms and pressed Britain to end their support of Japanese claims. The British became trapped between two ambitious, growing powers and were forced to choose in 1921, at the end of the term of the previous agreement. Ultimately, they chose to avoid upsetting the United States at the risk of upsetting Japan because they found that the US was the greater threat to British interests. Thus, when forced to make a decision between an imminent threat in the US and hypothetical future threat in Japan, the British chose to appease the Americans. To the very end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British believed that it had utility and was still an effective tool for Anglo-Japanese diplomacy, but could not risk rupturing Anglo-American relations. The Americans, for their part, made it perfectly clear to their British counterparts that the US government “would view with regret the renewal or establishment of any special relation of co-operation or partnership between the British Empire and Japan.” Indeed, Britain chose America over Japan, but only after the Americans pointedly closed off any option of continuing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Marlisha Katie Cordell is a second-year doctoral student at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas. She focuses on British diplomacy with the United States and Japan during and after the First World War. In 2025, she received the NACBS M.A. Essay Prize.

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